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APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCON
The estate planner is vitally interested in federal estate taxes
and where their ultimate burden will rest.' There are several
methods of reaching this determination, each of which will vary
the economic benefit enjoyed by the individual beneficiaries of
the estate.
When a lawyer plans an estate or drafts a will, he must realize
that apportionment of the estate tax burden is a distorting fac-
tor. In order to avoid this potential distortion and to perform
his function effectively, the lawyer needs "a clearcut 'nonmally
operative rule' from which . . . [he] can deviate by unambig-
uously drawn clauses where any such deviation better serves his
client's purposes."
2
The two basic concepts of apportionment of federal estate
taxes are denominated: (1.) burden-on-the-residue, and (2.) doc-
trine of equitable apportionment. The burden-on-the-residue
approach assumes that the estate tax is an expense of adminis-
tration to be paid out of the residuary estate like any other
administrative expense.3 The alternative equitable apportion-
ment approach places the tax burden on the beneficiaries in
proportion to the amounts of the estate received by them.
4
The South Carolina Supreme Court has formulated its own
normally operative rule for apportioning federal estate taxes in
this state. The purpose of this article is to apprise the reader of
the substance of this rule and its value when compared to the
rules adopted in other jurisdictions.
II. THE DIVERGENcE OF Orn~iow AmoNG THE STATES
ON THE QuEsTioN OF ULTIMATE BuRDEN OF ESTATE TAxEs
A. Generally
It is universally accepted that a testator may, in his will, fix
the onus of estate tax upon any of the various funds passing
1. In most cases the federal estate tax poses no problem for the estate
planner unless the estate exceeds $120,000 in value. Powell, Ultimate Liability
for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, n.1.
2. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
3. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 169, 176-88 (1954).
4. Id. at 171-88.
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under the will or on any of the various takers under the will by
clearly stating in the instrument where the ultimate burden of
estate tax is to lie.5 In addition there are statutes in effect in a
number of states which prorate the estate tax among the benefi-
ciaries of a will in the absence of an expression of the testator's
intent." Where there is neither a controlling statute nor a provi-
sion in the will, there is a divergence of opinion in the case law
of the several states as to whether the tax should be paid out of
the residuary estate or equitably apportioned pro rata among
the beneficiaries.7
B. Probate Property: Charging the Residuary Estate
v. Equitable Apportionment.
The experience of state courts with state inheritance taxes did
not prepare them for the apportionment problem presented by
the federal estate tax.8 Inheritance taxes imposed by state gov-
ernments were ordinarily taxes on the receipt of property by the
beneficiaries and were therefore self apportioning, each bene-
ficiary being taxed on the basis of the property he received.9
The federal estate tax, however, was a tax upon the transfer
as opposed to the receipt of property. 10 It was imposed with
reference to the entire estate, was required to be paid by the
administrator and was not apportioned by Congress. This led
many state courts to conclude that the federal tax created a debt
or charge against the estate, which as a matter of state law
should be paid (like other obligations on the estate) out of the
residue."
5. Id. at 170; Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 199, 203 (1954). As to the construction
and effect of provisions of a will relied upon as affecting the burden of taxa-
tion see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954).
6. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 199 (1954).
7. Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 170, 110 S.E2d 241, 244 (1959); Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 169 (1954).
8. This article does not consider property passing by intestacy because
generally when property passes by intestacy the estate tax is deducted before
any heir's share is computed and there is therefore no question of apportion-
ment. E.g., Hampton's Adm'r v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920).
But see Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955).
9. E.g., Simmons v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 134 S.C. 261, 132 S.E.
37 (1925).
10. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919);
In re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919).
11. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919);
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Treating the federal estate tax as an administrative expense
was relatively harmless when the estate tax was small in com-
parison to self apportioning state succession taxes. In the wake
of the depression, however, the estate tax was greatly increased
and correspondingly estate tax apportionment became more sig-
nificant.
During the early nineteen thirties there was a sharp increase
in litigation involving allocation of the estate tax burden.1'2 By
this time, however, the common law concept that the estate tax
was to be paid from the residuary estate had attained varying
degrees of intransigence in most states.13 Courts were reluctant
to depart from the burden-on-the-residue rule. This is evidenced
by the fact that few, if any, of the states in which this rule had
been established departed from the rule in cases involving only
probate property, without statutory authorization.14
This is not to say that the burden-on-the-residue concept has
been universally accepted as to property passing under a will.
A number of states have enacted statutes which provide that the
ultimate estate tax burden shall be prorated on the basis of
beneficial interest, if the testator has expressed no plan of ap-
portionment in the will.' 5 In states which have enacted such
statutes the courts seem to have no difficulty in finding a basis
for apportionment of estate tax on a pro rata basis independent
of the statute. For example, in Wilmington Thust Co. v. Cope-
12. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 199, 202 (1954).
13. Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment
Act, 43 MINN. L. REv. 907, 915 (1959).
14. Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q.
327, 330-31.
15. The first estate tax apportionment statute was passed by New York in
1930, N.Y. DECEDNar ESTATE LAW § 124 (McKinney 1949). That statute pro-
vided for general apportionment; i.e., prorating the burden among all bene-
ficiaries of either probate or non probate property, and served as a model for
apportionment statutes in other states. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 199, 203 (1954).
By 1958, there were seventeen states which had adopted apportionment
statutes, but three of those states had abandoned their statutes and returned to
the burden-on-the-residue rule, and four had confined their statutes to appor-
tioning a pro rata burden to non probate property. Powell, Ultimate Liability
for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q. 327, 334.
In Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942), the Supreme Court dispelled all
doubt as to whether or not apportionment of federal estate taxes was a matter
controlled by state law, stating:
Its [the federal estate tax] legislative history indicates clearly that
Congress did not contemplate that the government would be inter-
ested in the distribution of the estate after the tax was paid and
that Congress intended that state law should determine the ultimate
thrust of the tax.
1969] NoTs
3
Ailstock: Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
land' the Supreme Court of Delaware was presented with a
constitutional challenge to the retroactive application of the
Delaware apportionment statute. The Delaware court held that
there was no question of retroactive application of the statute,
stating: "The apportionment act did not change the law; it
declared as law a principle [equitable contribution] theretofore
firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.1-1
7
The rule of equitable apportionment as used to allocate federal
estate taxes, therefore has been applied, primarily, in states in
which an apportionment statute has been enacted. There is, how-
ever, case law from those states which declares the rule appro-
priate absent any statutory sanction.-' This body of case
law provides the basis for challenge of the "burden-on-the-
residue" rule in states in which that rule is grounded in common
law.'"
The suggested alternative when the burden-on-the-residue
rule is attacked is equitable apportionment, which is based on
the equitable theory of contribution. The doctrine of equitable
contribution as applied to apportionment of the federal estate
tax is an application of the venerable maxim "equality is
equity." 20 More specifically it rests on the principle that parties
having a common interest in a subject should bear equally any
burden affecting it and "that the right or burden should be equal-
ized among all the persons entitled to participate."1
2' It followed
that a federal estate tax lien, being a charge against the entire
estate, was a common burden which the various beneficiaries
should shoulder on a pro rata basis.
22
In summary, when the question of apportionment of estate
taxes on probate property arises, there is a split of authority
16. 33 Del. CI. 399, 94 A.2d 703 (1953).
17. Id. at 410, 94 A.2d at 709. See also Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Trust
Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691 (1942) ; Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918 (1951); McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank,
157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Industrial Trust Co. v. Dudlong, 77
R.I. 428, 76 A2d 600 (1950).
18. Annot. 37 A.L.R.2d 169, 172-75 (1954); see Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 94 A2d 703 (1953).
19. E.g., Gaither v. United States Trust Co., 230 S.C. 568, 97 S.E.2d 24
(1957) (appellant cites authorities in support of the doctrine of equitable
apportionment); Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 171-73, 110 S.E2d 241, 244-
45 (1959) (court adopts equitable apportionment as between probate and non
probate property).
20. 2 J. POMEROY, PIraERoy's EqUITY JURiSPRUDENCE § 405 (5th ed. 1941).
21. Id. § 406.
22, Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 408, 94 A2d 703,
709 (1953); Annot. 37 A.L.R.2d 169, 172, 174 (1954).
[Vol. 21
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over whether to apply the rule of (1) burden-on-the-residue-
formulated when estate tax was relatively insignificant, or
(2) equitable contribution--sanctioned by statute and declared
a part of the common law independent of the statute in a num-
ber of states.2
8
0. Taxable Non Probate Property: Charging the Residuary
Estate v. Equitable Apportionment.
The federal estate tax is imposed upon the gross estate of the
decedent.24 The gross estate is not limited to property which the
decedent owned at the time of his death, but also includes some
non testamentary assets. 25 These non testamentary assets are not
part of the decedent's estate within the ordinary lay definition
of estate as the assets and liabilities of a person left at death.
They are taxable, however, as part of the decendent's gross
estate.20 The gross estate, therefore, is a legislative fiction cre-
ated to facilitate the collection of estate taxes.
27
The question posed in each jurisdiction is this: Should the
same rule which controls the apportionment of estate tax among
testamentary beneficiaries (whether it be the burden-on-the-
residue rule or the equitable apportionment approach) be fol-
lowed as to non probate property included in the taxable estate
by a legislative fiction? Federal statutes may govern a small
area of the problem, but the question of apportionment of the
estate tax is primarily one for the state.28
In states having a general statutory provision for apportion-
ment of estate tax the rule was extended to probate and non
probate property alike.29 However, in several of those states, the
statutes were later modified to apply only to non probate assets
23. For a categorical treatment of the positions taken in the various states
see Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q.
327, 332-36.
24. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2106.
25. IxTr. RFV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2031-44; Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 169, 182
(1954).
26. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2051.
27. See also Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 175-76, 110 S.E.2d 241, 247
(1959).
28. See IN'r. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2206-07 (life insurance proceeds and
powers of appointment); Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate
Tax Apportionment Act, 43 MINN. L. REv. 907, 908-13 (1959) (effect of con-
flicting state law and federal legislation affecting apportionment).
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with the burden-on-the-residue rule being restored as to testa-
mentary property.80
In addition to the states in which equitable apportionment
was sanctioned by statute, several states which adhered to the
burden-on-the-residue rule as to probate property departed from
this rule and adopted equitable apportionment as to non probate
property.3 This turn of events was apparently precipitated by
the fact that the argument for equitable apportionment becomes
much more cogent in the context of non testamentary property
taxed as part of the estate.32 It seems unfair to deplete the
residue and general estate for the benefit of non testamentary
property, which the decedent probably did not consider part of
his estate, but which is taxed to the decedent because of the legal
fiction of a gross estate and made enforceable as a lien against
his estate. It seems more appropriate to invoke the doctrine of
equitable apportionment in such a situation to save some vestige
of the testator's plan than to allow complete distortion of the
contemplated distribution.33
III. ESTATE TAX APPORTIOMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Probate Property
South Carolina adheres to the general rule that the testator
may prescribe the order in which his assets are to be used for
the payment of his debts.3 4 In Patterson v. CleveandM the
supreme court held that this general rule was applicable to
debts created by estate or inheritance taxes and that the testator
could designate which gifts should be free of tax burden and
which should sustain it.
South Carolina also follows the general rule that, unless the
will directs otherwise, the residuary estate is first applied to the
payment of debts; then general legacies and specific legacies are
applied in that order.38 In Gaither v. United States Trust Co.37
30. See supra note 15.
31. E.g., Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Trust Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d
695 (1942).
32. Cf. Id. at 260, 21 S.E.2d at 695.
33. Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959).
34. Drayton v. Rose, 7 Rich. Eq. 328 (S.C. 1855); Pell v. Ball's Ex'rs,
Speers' Eq. 518 (S.C. 1844).
35. 165 S.C. 276, 163 S.E. 788 (1932).
36. Brown v. James, 3 Strob. Eq. 24 (S.C. 1849) ; Duncan v. Tobin, Dudley's
Eq. 161 (S.C. 1838); Warley v. Warley, Bailey's Eq. 397 (S.C. 1831).
37. 230 S.C. 568, 97 S.E.2d 24 (1957), discussed in Randall, Taxation, Sur-
vey of South Carolina Law, 10 S.C.L.Q. 131, 132-35 (1957).
[Vol. 21
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this general rule was extended to debts created by the federal
estate tax. The supreme court apparently felt that its previous
decisions relating to the general chargeability of debts of the
estate against the residuary compelled the adoption of burden-
on-the-residue rule for fixing the ultimate burden of estate tax.38
The appellant in Gaither asked the court to apply equitable
apportionment because prorating the ultimate tax burden would
facilitate the fuller use of the marital deduction (the husband
of the decedent was the residuary legatee).39 This argument was
dismissed on the ground that the court could not properly hear
it since it had not been raised in the lower court. The supreme
court's dictum indicated, however, that even if properly raised
the doctrine of equitable apportionment would not be appli-
cable.
40
It is clear that Gaither established burden-on-the-residue as
the operative rule for determining the ultimate burden of estate
tax on testamentary property in South Carolina.41 At least one
authority considered the Gaither decision to have established
the burden-on-the-residue rule as the South Carolina approach
to both testamentary and non testamentary property.42 It is now
apparent, however, that Gaither was limited to purely testa-
mentary property.
B. Non Probate Property Taxable to the Estate
In Myers v. Binkler43 the South Carolina Supreme Court was
presented with the following factual situation: The testatrix
created a trust in 1936 reserving to herself and other designated
parties a life interest. Upon expiration of the life interest the
corpus was to be held in trust for the benefit of a designated
class, per stirpes. Although the property conveyed to this trust
was subject to federal estate tax, it was not part of the probate
estate. The testatrix died in 1967 leaving a will which provided
38. Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959). See also Randall,
Taxation, Survey of South Carolina Law, 15 S.C.L. REv. 217, 218 (1963).
39. Gaither v. United States Trust Co., 230 S.C. 568, 576, 97 S.E.2d 24,
27-28 (1957). As to facilitating "marital deduction" see Pitts v. Hamrick, 228
F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955) (involving an intestacy).
40. Gaither v. United States Trust Co., 230 S.C. 568, 576, 97 S.E.2d 24,
27-28 (1957).
41. Randall, Taxation, Survey of South Carolina Law, 15 S.C.L. REv. 217,
218 (1963).
42. Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q.
327, 335 n.36.
43. 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959).
1969] NoTs
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that all state and federal estate and inheritance taxes "imposed
against my estate [should be paid] out of my residuary estate as
an expense of administration."
4
The court concluded that the testatrix had not intended to
charge the residuary estate with the burden of taxes generated
by the transfer of non probate property but that she had con-
templated only that the residue pay the taxes of her estate "in
the everyday sense of that word;" i.e., the taxes generated by the
transfer of her probate property.45 Having concluded that the
will made no provision for apportionment between the probate
and non probate assets, the court pointed out that there was
neither a controlling South Carolina statute nor applicable
South Carolina decision. Myers, therefore, presented an issue of
first impression in South Carolina; i.e., "[sihould the ultimate
burden of these (federal estate) taxes, which are imposed upon
the value of both probate and non probate assets, be borne by
the residuary probate estate alone, or ratably apportioned be-
tween the two estates? " 46
The court noted the division of opinion in other jurisdictions
on this point and articulated two questions relevant to resolution
of the issue:
(1) Which is the fairer and more reasonable---that
the ultimate burden of the tax be borne solely by the
beneficiaries of the residuary probate estate, or that it
be apportioned ratably between them and the bene-
ficiaries of the non-probate trust? (2) May such appor-
tionment be decreed in the absence of statutory
authority ?
7
As to which was fairer or more reasonable, the court stressed
the point that there were two estates involved, one probate and
one non probate which were lumped together under the rubric
of "taxable estate." The court also emphasized the related point
that it was unlikely that the testatrix contemplated the event-
uality that the assets of an inter vivos trust would be included
as part of her estate for tax purposes and the tax burden im-
posed on the residuary legatees.
44. Id. at 166, 110 S.E2d at 242 (empbasis added).
45. Id. at 168, 110 S.E2d at 243.
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As to the absence of statutory authority for apportionment,
the court made the laconic observation that "[lludicial applica-
tion of equitable principles requires no statutory sanction." 48
The court thereupon concluded that the doctrine of equitable
apportionment should be applied between probate and non pro-
bate estates, "the artificial concept of the two as a single taxable
estate" notwithstanding. 49
In Dial v. Ridgewood Tuberculosis Sanatorium50 the supreme
court encountered a factual situation superficially similar to
that presented in Myers. Again the question of apportionment
of estate tax between probate and non probate assets was in
issue. In Dial the husband of the testatrix created a testamentary
trust which gave the testatrix the right to the income for life
and the right to dispose of the corpus by her will. The testatrix
provided in her will for the payment of all federal and state
estate and inheritance taxes from her residuary estate.
The lower court relied on Myers and ordered apportionment
of the estate tax burden between the probate and non probate
assets. The supreme court reversed this decision relying not on
the probate-non probate distinction but upon the intent of the
testatrix.
In Dial the testatrix had been informed by her attorney that
the trust assets would be taxed to her estate. Knowing this, she
had provided in her will that the residue sustain all the tax
burden. Thus, the court deduced from this testamentary provi-
sion and the attendant circumstances that it was the testatrix's
intention that her estate bear this whole cost.
The Dial decision does not alter the substantive law estab-
lished in Myers, but does demonstrate the fact that the doctrine
of equitable apportionment applies to non probate assets only
where the testator has failed to express a contrary intention."'
If it can be shown that the testator relied on the fact that non
probate assets were taxable as part of his estate and provided
for payment of all taxes from the residue, then the residue will
bear the burden.
48. Id. at 175, 110 S.E2d at 247.
49. Id. at 175-76, 110 S.E.2d at 247.
50. 240 S.C. 64, 124 S.E.2d 598 (1962).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The "normally operative rule" of apportionment of estate tax
in South Carolina might be summarized as follows: With minor
statutory exceptions6 2 South Carolina follows the burden-on-
the-residue rule when the question is one of apportionment in-
volving only probate property.53 With respect to apportionment
between probate and non probate assets taxed as part of the
estate, South Carolina will apply to the doctrine of equitable
apportionment and apportion the estate tax burden.54 These
rules are of course subject to suspension by the manifestation
of a contrary intent by the testator.55
As the introduction to this article indicated, any "normally
operative rule" which prescribes what will happen when the
testator fails to provide for estate tax apportionment is desirable
because it provides a precise point of departure from which the
estate planner may proceed to draft documents to accomplish
the desired result. However, aside from the fact that any "nor-
mally operative rule" is valuable per se, the question arises as
to the relative merits of the rule fashioned by South Carolina's
judiciary.
One authority suggests the quality to be desired in any such
rule, other than preciseness which gives the draftsman his point
of departure, is the quality of most nearly coinciding with what
a majority of persons making wills and trusts would desire, were
they able to make their desires known when the question
eventually arises.50 Applying that test to strict burden-on-the-
residue and strict doctrine of equitable apportionment rules, the
same authority comes to this conclusion:
It is the considered judgment of this writer that dis-
posers of property, who are well advised, infrequently
desire apportionment of federal estate taxes as to the
assets passing outside their wills; but rather commonly
desire such apportionment as to the assets passing out-
52. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 2205-07. As to the South Carolina statute
which affects only a small area of the apportionment question of the state
estate tax see Randall, Taxation, Survey of South Carolina Law, 14 S.C.L.Q.
105, 106 (1961).
53. Gaither v. United States Trust Co., 230 S.C. 568, 97 S.E.2d 24 (1957).
54. Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959).
55. Dial v. Ridgewood Tuberculosis Sanatorium, 240 S.C. 64, 124 S.E.2d 598
(1962).
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side their wills. Thus the "normally operative rule"
should embody these attitudes, so that, if the will con-
tains no applicable tax clause, the desires commonly
present will be made effective. Any special circum-
stance, basing a desire to have a different rule applied,
can then be cared for by a tailor-made special clause.
The need for such clauses in most wills would be thus
eliminated.57
From this point of view, the South Carolina rule is the type
of "normally operative rule" which is most functional. It ap-
pears that the South Carolina judiciary has not only provided
a rule for apportionment of estate tax which reflects the desires
of the lay testator, but provides the requisite precision for
effective estate planning as well. 58
CnuAu s F. AImSTOCK
57. Id. at 338.
58. For view that a federal or uniform approach would be desirable see
Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act,
43 MINN. L. Rlv. 907 (1959).
NoT s1969]
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